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Abstract
The post-independence Nigerian state was faced with 
the intractable task of governing a multifaceted nation, 
comprised of 36 regional states which were divided 
along ethno-religious lines, up to 300 ethnic groups and 
a plethora of linguistic dialects, in addition to three (3) 
distinct religious groupings. The challenge of the post-
colonial Nigerian state was the efficient administration and 
governance of a broad-based society with a multiplicity 
of interests, values, traditions and cultural inclinations. 
The culmination of an atmosphere of mutual mistrust 
and dissatisfaction from different regions of Nigeria 
came with the advent of the Biafra secessionist battle 
of 1967. Following the end of the Biafra conflict, the 
Nigerian society became characterised with struggles and 
resistance against the state system in various forms, with 
the gripes and disquiets of various groups coming to the 
fore in various, often violent ways. Making use of library 
research and content analysis methologies, the authors 
trace the sequence of crises faced by the Nigerian state 
since independence, with a keen focus on the Biafra War 
of 1967, the Niger Delta crisis (particularly, the botched 
Amnesty Programme of 2009), as well as the current 
threat of Boko Haram terrorism which has taken hold of 
the Nigerian society since 2009. The paper concluded 
that, for the high ideals of Unity and Faith, Peace and 
Progress to be attained in Nigeria, the State must deal 
with corruption, ethnicity, religious fundamentalism and 
security related crimes, while doing more to restructure 
the polity and enthrone free and fair elections.
Key words: Retrospection; Aggression theory; Post-
independence Nigerian state 
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INTRODUCTION
Nigeria gained its independence from British colonialism 
in 1960, and advanced to a post-colonial order which 
was replete with socio-economic and political quandaries 
inherited from the erstwhile administration. The post-
independence Nigerian state was faced with the intractable 
task of governing a multifaceted nation, comprised of 36 
regional states which were divided along ethno-religious 
lines, up to 300 ethnic groups and a plethora of linguistic 
dialects, in addition to three (3) distinct religious groupings. 
As a nation which was artificially instituted by the British 
colonial powers at the expense of deep-rooted divergence 
between the array of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, 
the complexity of governing such an amalgamation in the 
post-independence era lay with new leaders with limited 
experience in statesmanship and public administration. 
Therefore, the key challenge for the state in the post-
independence era and beyond was patterning a diverse 
array of socio-economic and political exigencies stemming 
from distinct social groupings into a single state; each with 
distinct and non-mutually exclusive interests, an addition 
to the constitutional function of evolving such inherent 
differences into a practicable social contract. 
Essentially, the main source of the leadership quandary 
faced by the state since the post-independence era lies in 
the fact that the Nigerian nation is devoid of a common 
sense of affiliation and a shared bond between the various 
ethnic groups. (Carens, 1988) As stated by Carens, the 
establishment of a nation is determined by the sharing of 
commonalities in language, culture and traditions, by a 
range of national groups which have engendered habits 
of cooperation among one another over time (Carens, 
1988). The case of Nigeria presents a contrary paradigm. 
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In a similar manner to other colonised sub-Saharan African 
states, the European colonialists amalgamated nations out 
of numerous ethnic groups, which proved ungovernable 
for a majority of post-independence leaders. The Nigerian 
nation is comprised of three major ethnic groups, including 
the Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and the Yoruba, in addition 
to a myriad of smaller units. While the Nigerian state 
grapples with governing such a multifaceted society at the 
administrative level, at a social level, the divergence in 
views, values and interests between the various groupings 
has proved to be a source of inter-ethnic and inter-religious 
indignation. To this extent, among the range of factors 
which have contributed to the series of crises which 
Nigeria has witnessed since independence, the Nigerian 
problem can be attributed to the endemic level of inter-
ethnic tensions, as well as religious and sectarian divides.
A further element of the ethno-religious complexity 
was affixed to the Nigerian administration with the 
discovery of oil in 1956 in the Niger Delta region in the 
south of the country. The subsequent commencement 
of commercial production in 1961, which became 
predominated by foreign energy multinationals, introduced 
new political and economic dynamics, as increasing 
production instead led to the disenfranchisement of the oil-
bearing communities of the Niger Delta, and the increase 
in state oil revenues at the expense of the well-being of a 
large proportion of Nigeria’s populations (Johsnon, 2011). 
While the export of oil resources has led to the marked 
growth of per capita income levels to more than $2700 
and an average GDP growth rate of 7% annually, with oil 
production and exports accounting for approximately 98% 
of export revenue and 83% of state earnings, the daily 
socio-economic challenges which confront a majority of 
Nigeria’s inhabitants remain distinctly juxtaposed to the 
abundance of the oil wealth which has been amassed by 
the state since 1961 (Oludaru, 2008). 
To this extent, the main gripes of oil-bearing 
communities who have been marginalized from the 
benefits of the petroleum industry include concerns on the 
sharing of oil revenues, in addition to the management 
and control of oil resources, and the compromised ability 
of locals to derive any form of income from the oil sector. 
Resultantly, the disquiet from a significant proportion 
of Nigeria’s population stems from a combination of 
economic concerns relating to the perceptibly inequitable 
manner in which resource revenues are allocated to various 
ethnic groupings and their respective regions on one 
hand, and politico-economic foreboding stemming from 
concerns of political disenfranchisement and exclusion 
from the administrative dispensation of the Nigerian state 
based on ethno-religious and religious variance on the 
other. In light of these inherent complexities in Nigeria’s 
social composition, the state has been faced with recurrent 
socio-political crisis rooted in the multiplicity of interests 
from the various sub-groups since independence. Many 
a time, the various demands of the distinct ethnic and 
religious groupings which have been further compounded 
by regional disparities have manifested in the form of 
violent struggles (African Development Bank, 2011). 
While such tussles against the perceived injustices of 
the government by the various groupings have resulted 
in widespread infrastructural damage and innumerable 
human casualties since the post-independence era, the 
most prevalent casualty at the federal level has been the 
Nigerian state polity. Some of the various crises which 
have threatened the Nigerian state since independence 
are: i) the series of military coups d’états of 1966, 1975, 
1983 and 1985; ii) the Biafra Secessionist battle of 1967-
1970; iii) the Twelve Day Revolution of February 1966; 
iv) the Niger Delta crisis, which took a violent turn in the 
early 1990s and has since induced a spate of recurrent 
violence of militant the Delta’s militant groups; v) the 
more violent threats from the Boko Haram terrorist group 
in recent times; vi) a succession of elections which have 
been marred by violence and irregularities. All of these 
tumultuous events, among several others, have posed a 
grave threat to the national fabric, the stability, the overall 
functionality, and the foundation of the Nigerian state. 
In light of the mounting threats from the Boko Haram 
group, and the unrelenting menace of the Niger Delta’s 
militant groups, the authors’ intent in this article is to 
analyse the implications of the crises on the Nigerian state 
and leadership, the West African region, and the continent 
at large. The authors’ perspective in this regard is focused 
on the allusion of the consequences, if the Nigerian state 
was to disintegrate as a result of the debacles. The case 
studies that will be analyzed in this article include the 
Biafra Secession of 1967, the Niger Delta Crisis, from 
the perspective of the failures of the Niger Delta Amnesty 
Programme of 2009 and the implications of its collapse 
for the state, as well as the mounting threat of the Boko 
Haram group in light of the spate of daunting terrorist 
attacks carried out in various localities since 2010.
1.  THE REALIST APPROACH
As a theoretical framework for analysis of our current 
problematic, one is inclined towards the realist approach, not 
only for its innate dynamism and empiricism, but also for 
the comprehensive and enduring nature of its postulations, 
deriving as it does, from man’s innate desire to amass power 
and use it for the acquisition of fundamental values which 
he considers indispensable for his peace and happiness. 
Here power is seen as the most fundamental value, in the 
wake of which other values are bound to follow. The Boko 
Haram insurgency which is fast degenerating into an all out 
war between the Al Qaeda backed terrorist network and the 
Nigerian State is seen in this context.
The realist approach, as an outstanding contribution 
to the theoretical approaches to international politics, 
made its appearance in 1948 after the second world war, 
in Professor Hans J. Morgenthau’s “Politics among 
nations”. According to Morgenthau, international politics 
is a struggle for power. “States are impelled by the urge 
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to amass, protect and manipulate power: Power is the 
single “national interest” of everyone. He argued that, this 
clue to the behaviour of States would unlock the riddles 
of international politics and provide the scholar with the 
insight to understand the process and to give useful advice 
to the policy maker. (Lerche & Said, 1979, p.4)
But power has been defined as; “the ability of an actor 
on the international stage to use tangible and intangible 
resources and assets in such a way as to influence the 
outcomes of international events to its own satisfaction. 
(Rosen & Jones, 1980, p.203)
Power is thus seen as a means to an end, and an 
instrument for achieving objectives. Power is thus 
meaningful only within the context of its ability to create 
values in being able to bring about the attainment of set 
objectives. But since in the international system, power 
is relative, each state works assiduously and with all 
means at its disposal to establish and increase its power 
in relation to that of other states. This inclination among 
states necessarily generates a spirit of competition for 
power, developing into rivalry and fuelled by fear and 
suspicion, with its imperatives of a feeling of insecurity, 
precipitates or exacerbates conflict and an over-heating of 
the international system.
It is however pertinent to point out here that the 
concept of power does not necessarily involve the use 
of force. In certain circumstances the use of force may 
even be antithetical to the exercise of power, which rests 
in the ability to exert an influence to induce obedience or 
cooperation. Power is therefore not forced, and the ability 
to exert power is not limited to forceful situations (Rosen & 
Jones, 1980, p.204). This fact notwithstanding it is important 
to note that power is not separable from the force. Indeed 
force is the extreme use of power. According to Rosen and 
Jones (1980), force should be thought of as residing at the 
extreme end of a continuum of choice available to a nation 
when its agents want to manipulate the outcome of events.
But since the struggle for power among groups in 
Nigeria not only heightened tension, overheated the 
system and created circumstances of frustration and 
restless urge for power and control, the prevalence of 
insurrection and terrorism as well as the almost complete 
helplessness in trying to stop it, cannot be fully explained 
by the struggle for power alone. Hence the necessity for 
a complementary theoretical framework to be applied to 
our understanding of the causes of conflict and political 
violence in Nigeria: the Frustration – Aggression theory.
2.  THE FRUSTRATION—AGGRESSION 
THEORY 
The basis of the frustration – aggression theory is found 
in the works of John Dollard (a psychologist) and his 
associates in their pioneering work on the subject and in 
later research work carried out by Leonard Berkowitz 
(Dollard et al., 1937). 
Political Scientists who have employed this approach 
as a general basis for the explanation of political violence 
are, among others: James C. Davious, Ted Gurr, Ivo and 
Rosalind Feierabend and Doughlas Bwy (Midlarsky, 
1975, p.29).
This theory presents the idea of relative deprivation 
as a perceived disparity between value expectations 
and value capabilities. Or the lack of a need satisfaction 
defined as a gap between aspirations and achievement 
(Midlarsky, 1975). Simply put; when there is a gap 
between the level of value expectation, and the level of 
value attainment, due to lack of capability to establish 
a congruence between both levels, tension builds up 
due to the pressure of an unfulfilled aspiration or an 
unsatisfied urge or need. This, when not arrested in 
time leads to frustration.Frustration when it builds up 
leads to the rising up of suppressed emotions of anger 
which is often directed against the party considered to 
be the source of deprivation of satisfaction. This strong 
emotion finally finds an outlet through aggressive and 
invariably violent disposition towards the environment. 
That frustration invariably leads to aggression is already 
amply demonstrated in the Middle East by Palestinians, 
in the Persian Gulf by Iraq, in apartheid South Africa by 
the ANC and other liberation movements, and in Northern 
Ireland by the IRA, among so many others.
One is not unmindful here of the problems and 
limitations of the frustration – aggression thesis, such as 
the fact that an aggressive response to frustration may be 
dependent upon the individual’s level of tolerance. Or the 
fact that frustration, need not lead to aggression or that 
aggression need not always be negative and violent, but 
could also be positive and constructive. Howbeit, it is an 
established fact that frustration does produce a temporary 
increase in motivation, and thus lead to more vigorous 
responding. (Bandura & Walters, 1963, p.135). And this is 
perceived to be of sufficient generality to provide a basis 
for the explanation of virtually all forms of aggressive 
behaviour including political violence, which is of course 
a most apposite description of not only the Biafran 
debacle but also of the Niger Delta conflict.
It has been argued elsewhere that there is a certain 
inevitability about the association between such 
deprivation and strife; or that the basic relationship, is 
as fundamental to understanding civil strife as the law 
of gravity is to atmospheric physics (Gurr in Midlarsky, 
p.310). Although this may well be an exaggeration, it 
nevertheless underscores the relevance of this thesis 
to specific conflict scenarios in Nigeria. It is thus a 
valuable complement to the realist theory of power, as 
our framework for analysis of the problem of war and 
internecine conflict in the beleaguered nation.
2.1  The Biafra Secession of 1967
The Biafra Secession of 1967, which has also been 
termed the Nigerian Civil war, reflected the violent 
manifestation of deep-seated tensions between the various 
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ethno-religious and regional groups of the country. The 
amalgamation of various ethnic groups into a single 
Nigerian entity by British colonialists led to the implosion 
of the nation in the immediate post-independence era. 
The combustive events which took place within the early 
years of the post-colonial period were, largely, the result 
of marked incompatibilities between the leading Igbo, 
Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups, each with a 
distinct religious and socio-economic culture, in addition 
to variance in the regional location of each unit. Following 
independence in 1960, the severe cacophony between the 
three major ethnic groups which had been festering prior 
to the departure of the British administration culminated in 
the fervent clamber for state power of each ethno-regional 
unit. (Udofia, 1981) The ethno-regional and religious 
divide characterized by differences in leadership styles 
and socio-economic culture between the Hausa/Fulani of 
the North, the Igbo of the south-east, and the Yoruba in 
the south-western areas of the country led to the outbreak 
of violent inter-ethnic and inter-regional hostilities. 
In the decades leading up to the Nigerian Independence 
of 1960, the Igbo and Yoruba groups had become the 
spearheads for the nationalist struggle against colonialism, 
with each ethnic group holding a vision of how the post-
colonial state would be organized. While both the Igbo 
and Yoruba groups envisioned a federal state system 
for the post-colonial Nigerian polity, the Northerners, 
mainly comprised of the Hausa/Fulani group, chose to 
adhere to their traditional Islamist outlook and resist the 
development of a system of governance which would 
give primacy to western rule dominated by the southern 
ethnic groups. Notwithstanding the divergence between 
the northerners and the groups from the south of the 
country regarding the post-colonial order in Nigeria, post-
independence Nigeria became a state comprised of three 
main regions, with Governor-General Nnamdi Azikiwe as 
the first leader of the new state by 1960. 
While there were a series of events which revealed 
the acute level of ethno-regional divergence during the 
maiden tenure of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, the real challenge 
to the post-colonial state became apparent in the post-
electoral period. Following the general elections of 1964, 
the ethnological and regionally-based discordance came to 
the fore in the form of sectarian violence, indiscriminate 
and predominant attacks against the Igbo populations 
of the south-eastern regions of the country. (Mustapha, 
1986) The low-level violence erupted as a corollary 
of irregularities in the elections, and the refusal of the 
Igbo leader Dr Azikiwe to proceed with governmental 
appointments amid the electoral fracas. Following a 
series of increasingly flawed Western region elections 
in 1965, the antipathy from across the country induced 
anti-governmental sentiment, eventually leading to the 
overthrow of the Azikiwe administration, culminating in 
the coup d’etats of 1966 (Mustapha, 1986). 
Although the leaders of the coup, including then 
army officer Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and Major General 
Aguiyi Ironsi (both Igbo from the East) may have had 
well-founded intentions relating to steering Nigeria 
onto a path of improved political and socio-economic 
governance, the blaze of ethno-regional indignation which 
stemmed from the murder of Northern leaders during 
the state seizure led to the onset of low-level violence 
between Nigeria’s Eastern and Northern ethnic groups. 
During the coup of 1966 which culminated in the state 
leadership of Major General Ironsi, numerous prominent 
members of the erstwhile Azikiwe administration and 
the armed forces were murdered, many of whom were 
of Hausa/Fulani (northern) descent. The corollary of 
the apparent targeting of Hausa/Fulani military officers 
and political officials during the execution of the coup 
that brought Ironsi to power led to growing suspicions 
amongst the northerners that the new incumbents of the 
Nigerian state had ethnologically inspired intentions to 
bolster the predominance of the Igbo group in Nigerian 
politics at the expense of the Hausa/Fulani group and their 
respective region. ( Shelton, 2005) Among the prominent 
northerners who were killed during the coup were the then 
Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, as well as Sir Ahmadu 
Bello, the Sarduana of Sokoto – a state in the north-
western region of the country (Agbese, 1990).
The hostilities relating to the execution of Northerners 
during the initial coup of 1966 led to a counter-coup, 
which was launched by a Hausa/Fulani military leader, 
Lieutenant Colonel Murtala Mohammed. This particular 
coup eventually led to the ousting of Igbo political 
domination, and the installation of a Northern oriented 
government under Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon 
in July 1966 (Agbese, 1990). Following the Northern 
revolution in Nigerian politics, an ethno-regional retaliation 
followed in the form of the widespread massacre of the 
Igbo populations by enraged Northerners (Murray, 2007). 
Resultantly, from September of 1966 until the early months 
of 1967, the massacre of the Igbo people by Northerners 
spread throughout much of Nigeria, with casualties 
increasingly including innocent civilians (Udofia, 1981). 
As a rejoinder to the calamitous extermination of Igbo 
victims, the governor of the Igbo dominated south-eastern 
region, Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, declared 
the enclave an independent nation. 
In effect, the execution of Northerners during the 
initial coup d’état of 1966 engendered a manner of 
violent and, fervently, reactive hostility which eventually 
fanned the embers of secession among the Igbo groups 
of the East (Mustapha, 1986). On the 30th of May 1967, 
the Republic of Biafra was announced, with aggressive 
reactions from the Hausa/Fulani-dominated central 
military leadership (Mustapha, 1986) Consequently, the 
ethno-regional strife which culminated in the declaration 
of Biafra independence resulted in a civil war and a brutal 
secessionist battle which extended to 1970. 
2.2  The Implications of the Biafra Secessionist 
Battle on the Nigerian State 
The secessionist conflict informed by the creation of 
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Biafra represented the culmination of inter-regional and 
inter-ethnic discordance in the Nigerian national climate. 
The immediate corollary of the conflict, in addition to the 
mass murder of Igbo easterners and their predominantly 
Hausa/Fulani opponents in the North, was the ethnic 
and tri-regional cleavage of the Nigerian society. To the 
extent that the post-colonial polity was already battling 
with governing the trio of largely distinct ethnic groups 
effectively since the departure of the British colonialists in 
the 1960, the combustive inter-group tensions exemplified 
in the Biafra secession revealed the fragility of the 
Nigerian state system, and the undermined ability of the 
state to preside over a multifaceted nation. The claims 
of ethnic preference within a single multicultural and 
pluralistic nation as evidenced in the series of coups in 
1966 and the attendant secessionist battle exposed deep-
seated contradictions in Nigerian society.
The extent of the atrocities against the eastern Igbo 
nationals, and the extreme state of anarchy provoked 
by the 30 month war between the state security forces 
and the people of the said Biafra territory not only had 
dire humanitarian implications, but it equally altered the 
dynamics of political leadership in Nigeria as a whole. 
By the end of the war, the secessionist fervour of the Igbo 
population had become muted. Following the official 
surrender by Biafra’s chief of army staff, Major General 
Phillip Effiong on 12 January 1970 as a result of his 
declaration that the people of the Biafra region consent 
to the “authority of the Federal Military Government,” 
while equally accepting the “existing administrative and 
political structure of the federation of Nigeria,” the Igbo 
people once again became a governable component of the 
Nigerian federation (Oko, 1988). 
Due to the high rate of infrastructural destruction, 
the humanitarian damage in the form of mass deaths, 
widespread starvation and internal displacement within 
the eastern Igbo dominated region, the primary aim of 
the federal government, following the conflict, was the 
reconstruction of ruined properties, and the restoration of 
socio-economic order for the embattled peoples. Shortly 
following the end of hostilities in 1970, the General Yakubu 
Gowon administration instituted the Reconciliation, 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation programme, an initiative 
which was intended to engage in the appeasement of 
hostilities between Nigeria’s ethnic groups, the restoration of 
infrastructure and homes that were destroyed in combat, as 
well as the relocation of internally displaced peoples and the 
rectification of the socio-economic challenges of poverty, 
disease and malnutrition amongst the victims. (Thomas, 
2010) However, within the trajectory of inter-ethnic politics 
and deficient state rule as evidenced since independence in 
1960, the Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation 
programme became a blight of unfulfilled promises, a void 
in state legitimacy and public financial administration on the 
part of successive Nigerian governments. 
The ensuing years following the end of the Biafra 
war, and the resultant Reconciliation, Reconstruction 
and Rehabilitation programme witnessed a significant 
reorientation in the leadership and administration of 
the Igbo peoples by the Nigerian government. While 
the Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation 
programme was lauded for its magnanimous intent aimed 
at redressing the agitation of the Biafra secessionist battle, 
the Gowon administration’s lacklustre implementation 
of the scheme stimulated a well-founded sentiment of 
wariness and a lack of trust in the government’s ability to 
deliver on its promises. The Igbo people were left desolate 
following the war, and they were left to their own devices 
on the socio-economic and political level. In addition to 
being denied access to basic infrastructural and social 
amenities within their region, the Igbo people became 
equally relegated from Nigerian politics, with members of 
the ethnic group being discriminated against in the state 
and in official political posts (Akale, 2009). In analyzing 
the Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation 
programme, a member of the Biafran diaspora who fled 
Nigeria during the war asserted that the key flaw of 
Gowon’s initiative is that it excluded the vital component 
‘restitution’ (Simola, 2000). In this manner, the government 
neglected to compensate the Igbo people for the pogroms, 
and the misdeeds perpetrated against innocent civilians 
before and during the Biafra War (Simola, 2000).
Throughout the post-war era, the Igbo people came 
to be significantly marginalized from mainstream 
Nigerian society, becoming the victims of a widespread 
secessionist-inspired stigma; a trend which drastically 
undermined the principles of the Reconciliation, 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation programme (Simola, 
2000) In attempts to articulate the dynamics of the 
systematic marginalization of the Igbo people in the 
post-Biafra War, some scholars have alluded to a sense 
of Igbo phobia which has since prevailed across the 
Nigerian society and, particularly, within the ruling class 
(Orji, 2001). The disquiet of the Igbo people stemming 
from the tame implementation of the Reconciliation, 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation programme was 
succinctly echoed in the sentiment of Nigerian academic, 
Femi Ajayi when he states that:
The Igbos, Isokos, Okrikas, everyone is crying marginalization, 
from Port Harcourt through Sokoto to Maiduguri. I am being 
marginalized because of my name, my religion, my height, my 
size, my voice, my education…If Nigerians are not exposed 
to the truth, about the atrocities of the past years of misrule, 
how can we reconcile Nigerians and relate among ourselves as 
brothers and sisters...If we do not hear from those that polarized 
Nigerians, how do we want to have [the] true federalism that we 
are all yearning for? (Quoted in Orji, 2001) 
Within the context of the Nigerian polity, the 
systematic marginalization of the Igbo peoples played 
a key role in the long-term polarization of Nigerian 
mainstream society and politics. The failure of the 
Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation 
programme was a harbinger of the extreme bifurcation of 
public administration and governance of Nigerian society 
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along ethno-regional lines. The governance of Nigeria 
as a modern state has been reduced to the primordial 
inclinations, and ethnocentric allegiances, which manifest 
at the expense of a unified socio-economic and political 
national unit. The exclusionary principles of Nigeria’s 
state politics following the Biafra War have been serially 
confounded by the recurrence and prevalence of state 
corruption throughout successive regimes which have, 
by and large, shown little regard for the politically and 
socio-economically disenfranchised Igbo populations. 
Over successive military regimes, until the comprehensive 
constitutional reorientation upon the democratic 
revolution of 1999, the exclusionary political principles 
which became entrenched in the wake of the Biafra war 
became the order of the day in a coercive state which has 
since been characterized by a coercive form of ethnic 
hegemony (Obianyo, 2007).
2.3  The Niger Delta Amnesty Programme of 2009
Among several monumental events which have occurred 
in Nigeria that have, consequently, influenced the 
dynamics of state leadership and national governance, the 
Niger Delta crisis stands as one of the most predominant 
in altering the landscape of the national polity since 
Nigeria’s independence in 1960, following the discovery 
of oil in the former Delta state of Oloibiri (now Bayelsa). 
Following the commencement of the production of 
commercial quantities, mainly operated by foreign oil 
companies, the environmental and socio-economic 
landscapes of the Niger Delta have transformed in 
manner which has had negative enduring consequences 
for the inhabitants of the region (Ojakorotu, 2008). 
Although the Nigerian state has acquired a majority of 
its export revenue from the oil industry, the oil-bearing 
communities of the Niger Delta have been significantly 
beleaguered with a resource curse of underdevelopment, 
poor infrastructure, a lack of jobs and employment 
opportunities, and the destruction of pastoral and aquatic 
farming livelihoods which had historically sustained the 
region. (Oyeshola, 1975) Notwithstanding the plight of 
the oil-bearing communities, and the grave injustices 
they have historically faced at the hands of foreign oil 
companies, the Nigerian government has equally played 
a pivotal role in the socio-economic suppression of the 
people of the Niger Delta. By and large, the disquiet 
of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta has gone unheard, 
leaving oil-bearing communities only to the utilization 
of extreme measures with no objective redressing of the 
discrimination they have faced from the state. 
As a result of the destruction caused by commercial 
oil production, coupled with the largely negligent policies 
of the government, the inhabitants of the Niger Delta 
have taken up arms in the form of structured, ethnically-
originated militia groups which directly challenge the 
government for their disenfranchised position. Since 
the post independence era, several groups including 
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND), the Pan-Niger Delta Resistance Movement 
(CHIKOKO), the Environmental Rights Action, the Ijaw 
Youth Council (IYC), the Movement for the Survival of 
the Ogoni People (MOSOP), as well as the Movement 
for Reparation to Ogbia (MORETO), among several 
others, have blossomed from the Niger Delta in efforts to 
reclaim the human rights and dignity of the Niger Delta 
region, to restore the desired socio-economic liberties to 
the inhabitants and the political balance of power to the 
region (Hanson, 2007). Following the protracted violent 
onslaught against state security forces as well as the 
establishments and personnel of foreign oil companies’ 
operating in the Delta region by the various militias, the 
oil-producing region has been characterised by incessant 
instability and recurrent hostility with the federal 
government. Consequently, in efforts to placate the unrest 
within the region, the government has recurrently made 
use of compensative measures to the belligerents for the 
purpose of restoring normalcy across the region. 
One of such initiatives as launched by the state was 
the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme of 2009. The 
Amnesty Programme was launched by erstwhile Nigerian 
president, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, in efforts to appease 
the belligerence of the militants from the Niger Delta, 
while offering the armed groups and the Delta society at 
large, compensation for the losses they have experienced 
as a result of commercial oil production. The Amnesty 
Programme was premised on offering the armed militias a 
60 day grace periods within which they were required to 
hand in their munitions to the state, in return for financial 
recompense and reintegration into their immediate 
community. Essentially, this initiative was based on the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
framework, which stands for a time-honoured conflict 
management and peace-building solution (Nwagbara, 
2011). The scope of the Amnesty Programme was 
succinctly expressed in the brief of the initiative on the 
official programme website: 
The offer for amnesty is predicated on the willingness and 
readiness of the militants to give up all illegal arms in 
their possession, completely renounce militancy in all its 
ramifications unconditionally, and depose to an undertaking to 
this effect.( Niger Delta Amnesty Programme,2009) 
Notwithstanding the praiseworthy intentions of the 
Niger Delta Amnesty Program in resolving the age-
old Niger Delta crisis, the plan has fallen short of its 
tremendous expectations. Following the disarmament 
of several militias from the region, the disbursement of 
financial compensation to the neutralized combatants was 
widely reported to have been delayed, while some groups 
did not receive payments as entailed in the agreement 
(Sango, 2009). While a large proportion of the Niger 
Delta militias were seemingly forthcoming in adhering to 
the disarmament and demobilization components of the 
Programme until groups such as the MEND reneged on the 
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process, the government’s delivery of its compensation as 
part of the rehabilitation component was equally lack-lustre. 
Although the Yar’Adua administration was forthcoming 
in liaising with the leaders of the MEND for the purpose 
of considering the core concerns of the group first-hand, 
the general lack of trust between the stakeholders saw 
the collapse of the dialogue, and the eventual relapse into 
armed violence.(Omadjohwoefe, 2011) As a rejoinder to the 
buckled dialogue between the MEND and the government, 
the leader of the militant group asserted that “I believe that 
all that you witnessed was a sham…fighting will resume 
soon.” (Baldauff, 2010) The sentiment expressed by David 
Okah bore resonance with the trend of militancy in the 
Niger Delta and the general level of dissatisfaction with the 
government’s approach to the proposed Amnesty agreement. 
The resurgence of conflict in early 2010 signalled the 
resumption of violence and agitation throughout the Niger 
Delta region, and the eventual breakdown in the objectives 
of the Amnesty Programme. 
2.4  The Implications of the Botched Niger Delta 
Amnesty Programme on Leadership in Nigeria 
The failures of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme 
can be traced to the historical ineptitude of the Nigerian 
government in addressing the core interests of its various 
regional and ethnographic groupings. Upon the discovery of 
oil in the Niger Delta, the newly independent Nigerian state 
devoted a considerable level of administrative commitment 
to the commercial production of oil for the export market, 
at the expense of the livelihoods and overall well-being of 
the oil-bearing communities. The bifurcation of Nigeria’s 
ethnic groups and the respective geographic regions which 
became more pronounced following the Biafra War of 1967, 
led to the increased political neglect of the ethnic groups of 
the Niger Delta, with the government giving more primacy 
to bolstering the commercial value of the region to the state. 
In the long-term, the corollary of the negligent leadership on 
the part of the Nigerian state has been the dire destruction 
of natural environments in the Niger Delta region including 
farm lands, wetlands and aquatic resources from which the 
inhabitants historically derived their livelihood. Moreover, 
the enclave nature of the oil production industry has implied 
that a majority of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta have 
not been included at the employment level, leaving them 
to the limited options for generating income from the ram 
shackled economic conditions in the region. Accordingly, 
the militancy which has become characteristic of the Niger 
Delta milieu was a response from disgruntled inhabitants 
who had the aim of contesting the government’s neglectful 
approach to their plight. 
Within this historical perspective, the collapse of the 
Niger Delta Amnesty Programme of 2009 is rooted in 
the leadership failures of the Yar’Adua administration 
and the successive Jonathan government which has since 
taken the reins of the initiative. Although the Yar’Adua 
administration had shown proactive signs of commitment 
to the plight of the people of the Niger Delta, the resultant 
reproach of the Programme from a significant proportion 
of militias and inhabitants alike revealed the high level of 
distrust in Nigeria’s federal leadership. Critical to this lack 
of trust in the administrative objectives and practice of the 
Nigerian state was the contention that the government’s 
approach to the Niger Delta crisis has not devoted enough 
attention to the root causes of the conflict. On the basis 
of this outlook, the state is significantly undermined in its 
ability to develop and deploy conflict resolution measures 
which have a lasting impact on the age-old tensions in the 
Niger Delta (Sango, 2009).
The inability of the state to tackle the quandary of the 
Niger Delta at the level of the root causes of the conflict 
has been echoed by Jomo Gbomo, the spokesperson of 
the MEND when he said that “we have no faith in the 
amnesty programme. Our position remains the same. 
We do not identify with an amnesty that does not give 
room for dialogue and fails to address the root causes that 
give birth to the struggle (Olukoya, 2010). Essentially, 
notwithstanding the federal government’s commitment 
to delivering financial compensation to the demilitarized 
combatants, in addition to providing rehabilitation for 
their reintegration into mainstream Delta society, it 
is more imperative for the state to revert its efforts to 
the root causes of the current predicament, rather than 
devoting attention to the symptomatic elements of the 
protracted crises. Ultimately, the outcome of the Amnesty 
Programme is a fitting reflection of the magnitude of the 
protracted Niger Delta crisis. In a similar manner to other 
crises which have plagued the Nigerian society and state, 
the prolongation of the Niger Delta melee is an illustration 
of the ineptitude of successive federal governments in 
tackling the regionally based and ethnocentrically inspired 
quandaries which successive political leaderships have 
sought to grappled with, since independence. Thus, based 
on the succession of national calamities since independence, 
the willpower of the leadership has been intermittently 
undermined by the narrow ethno-political principles that 
have, consequently, led to the loss of faith in the state 
structure and the federal system on the part of the Nigerian 
citizenry. In recent times, ethno-religious and regional 
discordance has come to the fore in the form of terrorist 
attacks on national infrastructure and innocent civilians. 
2.5  The Unremitting Threat of Boko Haram 
Terrorism in the 21st Century 
While the crevices in the Nigerian polity and in the nature 
of the leadership began to appear in the post-independence 
era  fo l lowing the  t rans i t ion  f rom the  co lonia l 
administration, the vestiges of misrule and misgovernance 
have continued to plague the state and society at large. 
The antiquated ethnological, region-centric and creed-
inspired leadership principles which were prevalent in the 
post-independence era have continued to trump the values, 
interests and traditions of a limited range of ethnic groups, 
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at the expense of those on the peripheries of political 
headship. To this extent, the range of crises which have 
affected the Nigerian state since independence, (most of 
which have had an ethnological, religious and region-
centric inclinations), has continued apace well into the 
21st Century. Among such crises in recent times include 
the spate of terrorist attacks as perpetrated by the Boko 
Haram group of the Northern areas of Nigeria. 
The Boko Haram group is an extremist Islamist 
group which was formed in 2002 by fundamentalist 
Muslim cleric Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, a Hausa/Fulani 
from the North of Nigeria, based in Kanamma, Yobe 
State. Boko Haram, which loosely translates to ‘western 
education is evil,’ is an organisation which is premised 
on the imposition of Sharia Islamic law in the north of 
Nigeria where the Hausa Fulani is the dominant ethnic 
group (Chothia, 2011). Boko Haram is the mainstream 
pseudonym for the organisation originally known as the 
Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, which 
translates to ‘People Committed to the Propagation of 
the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad’. It was formed on 
the contention that Western education, democratic rule 
and secularism are largely corruptive to Nigerian society 
(Chothia, 2011). Accordingly, Boko Haram stands 
diametrically opposed to the Nigerian polity and has, 
since its inception, engaged in numerous violent attacks 
on key hallmarks of Western democracy as well as the 
establishments of Nigerian security forces. Boko Haram’s 
stern opposition to democracy was encapsulated in a 
statement made by former group leader Mohammed Yusuf 
in an interview, in which he declared that “democracy 
and [the] current system of education must be changed, 
otherwise this war that is yet to start would continue for 
long” (Al Jazeera,2009).
Although the group was originally formed in 2002, 
the spate of terrorist attacks committed by Boko Haram 
only came to the fore in 2009. In July of 2009, the 
extremist militants carried out a series of attacks across 
three states in the North of Nigeria, namely: Yobe, Kano 
and Borno. The series of attacks resulted in the death 
of approximately 700 civilians in the course of a brutal 
operation which lasted for a period of 5 days, from the 25 
to 30 July (Al Jazeera, 2009). The attacks involved the 
torching of a police station in the Potiskum town of the 
Yobe State, in addition to the Maiduguri police quarters 
in the Borno State. In a succession of violent onslaughts, 
the Boko Haram militants proceeded to raze an additional 
police station, a local church as well as a government 
customs building in the Gamboru-Ngala town in Borno 
State (Chothia, 2011). The cycle of violent strikes by the 
Boko Haram group culminated in the apprehending and 
eventual execution of the erstwhile leader Mohammed 
Yusuf, in addition to the arrest of several other lower-
ranking members of the group (Adesoji, 2010). 
While the demise of the radical terrorist leader dealt 
a severe blow to the operations of Boko Haram, the 
group has since reordered its undertakings, and it has 
continued to engage in violent attacks against civilians 
and significant establishments of the Nigerian state and 
society. Among the various acts of terrorist violence which 
the group has perpetrated since the death of Mohammed 
Yusuf are an attack on civilians in the metropolis area 
of Maiduguri on 1 January 2010; a pre-election attack 
on a police station on April 1 2010 in Bauchi; the bomb 
blasting of an election polling centre on 9 April 2010 in 
Maiduguri; the murder of several Muslim clerics, coupled 
with attacks on police officers in Maiduguri on 20 April 
2010; a bomb attack on police headquarters in Abuja on 17 
June 2011 as well as the more recent suicide bomb-blast 
on 26 August 2011, amongst a number of other attacks 
(Abdullahi, 2011). But perhaps the most significant and 
most devastating blows against the state, were the April 
14, 2014 Yanya bombing that claimed 75 lives, injuring 
60 others in the federal capital territory of Abuja, and the 
abduction the following day of over 200 girls at Chibok in 
Borno State of Nigeria. This not only precipitated global 
outrage and stern warnings to the Sect by the UN, but 
also brought US Special forces into Nigerian soil for 
military operations for the first time on May 6, 2014. On 
the 5th day of May 2014, three hundred unsuspecting 
civilians had been murdered in their homes and eleven 
more girls abducted in Gamboru Ngala, a border town 
with Cameroun. The American Special forces were to 
assist in locating and rescuing the abducted maidens.
2.6  The implications of Boko Haram Attacks on 
the Nigerian State Polity
This spate of Boko Haram attacks which came to the fore 
in 2009 represented the continuation of fervent attempts 
by the fundamentalist Islamist group to altering the ethno-
religious and political dynamics of Nigerian society 
and polity from a secular to a theocratic order. While 
similar ethno-religious uprisings have previously been 
suppressed, including the Maitatsine clashes of 1980 in 
Kano state, the 1982 attacks in Kaduna and Bulumkutu as 
well as the violent onslaughts in 1984 in Yola and 1985 
in Bauchi respectively, collectively, the series of ethno-
religious attacks against the Nigerian state represent 
the widespread disquiet across society, based on largely 
exclusionary and ethnocentric leadership principles of 
successive governments. To this extent, the root cause 
of previous attempts to destabilize and, eventually, 
transform the Nigerian state stem from prevalent inter-
group dissatisfaction with the socio-economic and 
political marginalization of different ethnio-religious and 
regional groups at the expense of the ruling elite, which 
has oftentimes been organized around a single ethnie. In 
the same breath, the formation and eventual uprising of 
Boko Haram, beginning in 2009, is a reflection of decades 
of disenfranchisement, and displeasure with the leadership 
and administration of the Nigerian state and society. 
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Threat to Nigeria Since 1960: A Retrospection
218
Prominent Nigerian scholar and Boko Haram researcher 
has reiterated this contention, in stating that: 
Boko Haram is essentially the fallout of frustration with 
corruption and the attendant social malaise of poverty and 
unemployment…The young generation see how [the nation’s 
resources] are squandered by a small bunch of self-serving 
elite which breeds animosity and frustration, and such anger is 
ultimately translated into violent outbursts. (Mohammed, 2011) 
Consequently, the reactive violence of the Boko 
Haram group has come to present a dire threat to the 
stability and overall functioning of the Nigeria state. 
Although numerous members of the group have often 
been apprehended following the series of onslaughts since 
2009, the threat of Boko Haram has not subsided, and it 
continues fervently despite the barrage of sturdy reproach 
from the state and national security agencies. Moreover, 
since the arrest and execution of former leader Yusuf 
Mohammed in 2009, the group has reoriented its strategy 
and adopted a more underground organisational structure, 
relying on clandestine approaches and unfamiliar 
leadership formations in order to continue overriding 
the security measures of the Nigerian state (Mohammed, 
2011). The resultant difficulty in managing a group which 
has assumed the elaborate organisational tactics of larger 
terrorist entities presents an almost daunting challenge 
for the Nigerian government, which already reveals its 
security and intelligence deficiencies in its inability to 
infiltrate the group and effectively intercept its activities 
(Adesoji, 2010). While the weaknesses of the Nigerian 
state in terms of delivering necessary socio-economic 
amenities to its population has long engendered mistrust 
and widespread discontent which has resulted in the 
emergent extremist resistance groups such as the Boko 
Haram, the attack on government institutions, security 
force personnel and innocent institutions manifests as a 
peril to the governability of Nigerian society.
3.  CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
Boldly emblazoned in Nigeria’s Coat of arms are the 
words; Unity and Faith Peace and Progress. This no doubt 
encapsulates the hopes and aspirations of the founding 
fathers of this potentially great country wracked by the 
very same phenomena that constitutes the negation of 
these aspirations of the founding nationalists who worked 
assiduously for its emergence as a mighty player in the 
comity of nations. Finding itself in a state of anomie 
that has lasted for all of five decades, Nigeria faces the 
threat of disintegration and a collapse into its constituent 
primordial units. 
Perhaps one of the most pungent pointers to this threat 
is the fact of the low key 2011 independence anniversary 
celebrations during which President Jonathan and other 
celebrants were for the first time restricted to the very 
precincts of Aso rock Villa, ostensibly because of the need 
for prudence, obviously on account of the threats from 
not only the Boko Haram but also from the MEND, that 
has warned citizens to stay away from the Eagle Square 
during the period of the celebrations. MEND had in the 
2010 independence celebrations embarrassed the Federal 
Government by planting explosives close to the Eagle 
Square in Abuja where the Country’s 50th independence 
anniversary celebrations were being held. 
The avoidance of the Eagle Square in this year’s 
celebrations by the Government was perhaps simply a 
matter of prudence in the face of adverse security reports. 
The latest criminal gang on the national scene however 
is probably not the MEND, but the Boko Haram. This 
extremist Islamic sect with links to the Al Qaeda terrorist 
network and based in Maiduguri is demanding among 
other things, the imposition on Northern parts of the 
Country, of the Islamic Legal system. It has, in the last 
two or more years maintained bloody visibility through 
cold blooded murder of innocent people and members of 
the Police force using guns and bombs (Onabanjo, 2011).
On the 1st of October 2011 while the independence-day 
celebrations were on, the group had gunned down three 
innocent people in Borno State. Besides Boko Haram and 
the MEND, the Country is also facing the challenge of 
ethno-religious crisis in Plateau State in the middle belt 
region of the country. 
Hundreds of lives have been lost in the Plateau 
pogrom, apparently sparked off by ethnic and religious 
intolerance. The raging crises in Plateau, Borno 
and Kaduna States have in the mean time led to the 
displacement of over one million residents. (Lawal 
& Garba, 2011). This is really not the total figure of 
internally displaced persons due to the crisis, but of only 
those being resettled in Bauchi State alone. Most of the 
persons who ran to Bauchi from Kaduna for safety are 
victims of the political crisis that erupted after the April 
2011 Presidential elections. According to the Director-
General of the National Emergency Management Agency 
(NEMA), Alhaji Mohammed Sani Sidi, over one million 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been resettled in 
various locations in Bauchi State. (Lawal & Garba, 2011) 
Within a supposedly united Nigeria, parties to the conflict 
in Plateau State are insisting that they can no longer live 
together, reinforcing fears that the Country’s fragile unity 
may collapse at short notice.
The North Central zone of the Country is not alone in 
the prevailing sentiments of dismembering the Country. 
There are States in other parts of the Country where citizens 
relate with one another with utmost mutual suspicion and 
sometimes hatred resulting in orgies of violence. For over 
a decade the Country has been buffeted by ethno-religious 
crisis compounded by Government’s inability to address 
the issue of poor leadership, bad governance, corruption, 
unemployment, rigged elections, economic and socio-
political marginalisation as well as a politics of exclusion, 
and prebendalism in zero sum perspectives. 
According to Onabanjo (2011):
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Indeed over the years, Nigeria as a united country has been 
bruised and brutalised, leading to destruction of lives and 
property.The prevailing high level of modern weapons 
of warfare like bombs and explosives has brought a new 
dimemsion into protests over disagreements among stakeholders 
in the Nigerian project.
Onabanjo further stated that in virtually all the instances, 
Nigeria’s Unity ship has been strongly rocked as people 
were forced to leave crisis areas and return “home” to their 
kith and kin, to prevent avoidable deaths. There has also 
been trenchant calls for a restructuring of the Nigerian 
union through dialogue, referendum and sovereign national 
conference. Attempts to implement some of these in the past 
had met a brick wall as the government of the day, whether 
military or civilian paid only half hearted commitment to the 
idea, as they specified areas that could not be discussed or 
negotiated, such as; Federalism, Presidentialism, Secularism 
and Federal character. Some nationalities are now openly 
campaigning for self determination. The Ijaw National 
Congress (INC) and the Movement for the Actualisation 
of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), for example 
have maintained at different times their commitment to self 
determination in the absence of equity and social justice 
in the Nigerian Federation. Nor is their position different 
from that of the Oodua Peoples’ Congress (OPC) which was 
established to fight for Yoruba self determination. 
The annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential 
elections by the Babangida Administration had led some 
leaders from the South-West zone to call for outright 
separation from the federal republic or in the alternative a 
restructuring of the Nigerian State. Recently the national 
chairman of a major political party in Nigeria, the ACN, 
Chief Bisi Akande, had warned that; “there will be no 
Nigeria But by the grace of God, there will be the Yoruba 
nation.” He further stated that, failure to restructure in order 
to give the Yoruba nation the autonomy to run itself will 
see Nigeria break up on its own without any further need 
for secession by any group (Onabanjo, 2011). Nor is Chief 
Akande alone in this prediction.
As far back as the year 2000, United States security 
report had predicted Nigeria’s demise as a single political 
entity by 2015 (Akande in Onabanjo, 2011). John 
Campbell, former US ambassador to Nigeria, in his book 
“Dancing on the Brink”, also warned that if care is not 
taken, Nigeria might fail as a united Country (Onabanjo, 
2011). Campbell blamed Nigeria’s situation on a set of 
dysfunctions: a weak government and rigged elections, a 
ruling elite who view the state as a dispensary for petro- 
profits, endemic corruption, bloody sectarian violence 
between radical Moslems and Christians as well as the 
curse of Oil wealth which encourages Nigerians to ignore 
industrial development and agriculture.
Whether or not these predictions will come to pass 
remains to be seen, but at the moment, with the on-going 
recurrence of endemic social threats like armed robberies, 
kidnappings, political assassinations, rape and unresolved 
murders, creating and fuelling the existing state of anomie 
within the republic, there does not seem to be much hope 
for Unity and Faith, let alone Peace and Progress.
CONCLUSION 
Since the prospects for fragmentation of the Nigerian State 
is no longer inconceivable in the face of the numerous 
and daunting security challenges, it may be pertinent in 
concluding this paper, to take a cursory look at the likely 
implications of a disintegration of the Nigerian State into 
its constituent primordial units. It is obvious that a division 
along the lines of three regions of North, East and West 
will hardly solve the problem of ethnic rivalry, of tribalism 
and of corruption. The existing animosities among ethnic 
nationalities in the Niger Delta, Kogi, Benue and plateau 
States where groups that have engaged one another over 
differences which include among other things Political 
dominance and Socio-economic marginalisation will 
certainly not disappear. It might even become exacerbated 
through an all-out struggle for control of oil fields. It 
might even result in ethnic cleansing operations similar to 
Rwanda or Yugoslavia.
Within each of the larger ethnic groups themselves, 
the contradictions run very deep, as there are further 
fragmentations among the Ibos, among the Yorubas and 
even among the Northern Muslims. Many minorities in 
the West detest the Yorubas. An attempt by the landlocked 
Ibos to gain access to the sea is bound to bring them into 
conflict with the Eastern minorities down South. This is 
why Lekan Oguntiyinbo, argued that disintegration of the 
Nigerian State would be unwise and would only lead the 
country down a messy path of unprecedented factionalism. 
According to Oguntoyinbo;
My second biggest fear is the impact on West Africa. Nigeria 
is the economic and military rock of the region. The West, the 
UN and AU count on our political and military support to help 
ensure stability in neighbouring countries. The disintegration 
of this rock will spell doom for the region. My other fear is that 
disintegration will encourage misguided petty potentates around 
the continent of which there is no shortage (Onabanjo, 2011).
This position of Oguntoyinbo was supported by Gabriel 
Olusanya, former Director-General of the Nigerian Institute 
of International Affairs (NIIA) who argued that Nigerians 
had developed certain integrating mechanisms over 
time, across the board, such as inter-marriages, business 
relations and other common interests that cut across 
ethnic and religious boundaries. These could be built upon 
and emphasized to begin the process of reconciliation 
and nation building. Besides, the State must deal with 
Corruption, ethnicity, religious fundamentalism and 
security related crimes with a very firm hand, while doing 
more to re-structure the polity and enthrone free and fair 
elections. This may not be easy but the alternative is not 
only foreboding, it would be absolutely unacceptable.
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Threat to Nigeria Since 1960: A Retrospection
220
REFERENCES
Abdullahi, B. S. (2011, September 14). Abuja attack: Car bomb 
hits Nigeria UN building. BBC News. Retrieved from http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 14677957. 
Adesoji, A. (2010). The Boko Haram uprising and Islamic 
revivalism in Nigeria. Africa Spectrum, 45(2), 95-108.
African Development Bank. (2011). African economic outlook. 
(pp.1-15). Nigeria. 
Agbese, P. O. (1990). The impending demise of Nigeria’s 
forthcoming third republic. Africa Today, 37(3), 23-44.
Akale, K. N. (2009). The “biafranisation” of Igbo identity: 
Rethinking the Igbo in post-civil war relations and 
nation-building in Nigeria. Milwaukee: Reconciliation, 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program (pp. 1-33). 
Jazeera, A. (2009). Deadly Nigeria clashes spread. Retrieved 
September 18, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/afri 
ca/2009/07/2009727134953755877.html
Baldauff, S. (2010, August 20). Nigeria militants call off truce in 
oil-rich Niger Delta. Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 
from http//www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/content/
view/print277043
Bandura, A. & Walters, R. H. (1963). Social learning and 
personality development. New York: Holt Rhine Hart.
Carens, J. H. (1988). Immigration and the Welfare State. In A. A. 
Gutman (Ed). Democracy and the Welfare State. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Chothia, F. (2011, September 18). Nigeria policemen in court 
trial for Boko Haram killing. BBC News. Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 14136185
Chothia, F. (2011, September 18). Who are Nigeria’s Boko 
Haram Islamists? BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501
Dollard. J. E. (1937) Frustration and aggression. Yale: 
University Press
Federal Government of Nigeria. (2009). Niger delta amnesty 
programme. Retrieved 18th August 2011 from http://www.
nigerdeltaamnesty.org
Hanson, S. (2007). MEND: The Niger delta’s umbrella militant 
group. Foreign Affairs: Backgrounder. 
Johnson, T. (2011). Boko Haram. Council on Foreign Relations: 
Backgrounder, 1-6.
Lawal, I., & Garba, A. (2011) Crisis in the plateau, borno 
displace a million Nigerians. The Guardian September 20.
Lerche, C & Said, A. (1979). Concepts of international politics 
in global perspective. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Midlarsky, M. (1975). On war. New York: The Free Press.
Mohammed, A. (2011, September 23). Understanding Nigeria’s 
Boko Haram Radicals. IRIN. Retrieved from http irinnews.
org/report. aspix?eportid=93250
Murray, S. (2007, May 30). Reopening Nigeria’s civil war 
wounds. BBC News.Retrieved September 12, 2011 from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6657259.stm 
Mustapha, A. R. (1986). The national question and radical 
politics in Nigeria. Review of African Political Economy (37), 
81-96.
Nigerian police. (2011, September). Gubernatorial candidate 
assassinated. CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.
com/2011/WORLD/africa/01/28/nigeria.violence/index.
html?iref=allsearch
Nwagbara, U. (2011). The Nigerian press, the public sphere and 
sustainable development: Engaging the post amnesty deal in 
the Niger Delta. In Africana: The Niger Delta (pp. 1-332). 
Burton, A. C.
Obianyo, N. N. (2007). Citizenship and ethnic militia politics in 
Nigeria-marginalization or identity question? The Case of 
Massob. 5th Global Conference on Pluralism Inclusion and 
Citizenship, (pp. 1-11). Salzburg.
Odularu, G. O. (2008) Crude oil and the Nigerian economic 
performance. Oil, Gas and Business, 1-29.
Ojakorotu, V. (2008). Environmental activism and the struggle for 
justice by the non-governmental organisations in the Niger 
Delta of Nigeria. The International Journal of Regional and 
Local studies, United Kingdom, Series 2, 4(2).
Oko, O. (1998). Partition or Perish: Restoring social equilibrium 
in Nigeria through reconstruction. Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review, 8, 318-336.
Olukoya, S. (2010). Inter Press News Agency, Jomo Gbomo 
Interview. Retrieved from http.//ipsnews.net/africa/nota 
asp?idnews=51178
Omadjohwoefe, S. (2011) Amnesty initiative and the dilemma 
of sustainable development in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria. Journal of Sustainable Development, 4(4), 256.
Onabanjo, D. (2011). What if Nigeria breaks up? TELL 
Magazine, October 17.
Orji, E. I. (2001). Issues on ethnicity and governance in 
Nigeria: A Universal Human Rights Perspective. Fordham 
International Law Journal, 25 (2), 431-482.
Oyeshola, D. (1975). Essentials of environmental issues: The 
world and Nigeria in perspective. Ibadan: University Press.
Rosen, S., & Jones, W. (1980). The logic of international 
relations. Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers.
Sango, T. J. (2009). A yardstick towards the resolution of 
internal conflict. Abuja: 1st Women for Peace International 
Conference, Yar Adua Conference Centre.
Shelton, D. L. (Ed.). (2005). Encyclopedia of genocide and 
crimes against humanity. Biafra-Nigeria, Gale Cengage. 
Http//www.enotes.com/genocide-encyclopedia. Accessed 
September 15, 2011
Simola, R. (2000). Time and identity: The legacy of Biafra to the 
Igbo in Diaspora. Nordic Journal of African Studies, 9(1), 
98-117.
The Nigerian Tribune. (2011, September 15). Boko Haram 
strikes again in Borno, Kills 4. Retrieved from http://
www.tribune.com.ng/index.php/front-page-news/16402-
boko-haram-Thomas, A. N. (2010). Beyond The Platitude 
of Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in 
Nigeria: Revolutionary Pressures in the Niger Delta. Journal 
of Sustainable Development in Africa, 12(1), 54-72.
Udofia, O. E. (1981). Nigerian political parties: Their role in 
modernizing the political system, 1920-1966. Journal of 
Black Studies, 11(4), 435-447.
